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• Is the current policy makers’ preference for fixed-price
contracts as opposed to cost-plus contracts in DoD acquisition
practice justifiable? What are the potential negative
consequences of advocating use of fixed-price contracts?





• Large cost overruns in Major Defense Acquisition Programs
(MDAP)
– According to GAO report, in 2008 approximately 70% of 96
MDAP experienced huge cost overruns, reaching over $295
billion (a 26% overrun) over the life of the projects.
• Widespread criticisms from various sources in Congress, the
Administration, and taxpayers.
– A major critique is that the increasing use of cost-plus
contracts is a key contributing factor to large and frequent
cost overruns.




– In a briefing on his acquisition reform on March 4, 2009,
the President stated that“The days of giving defense
contractors a blank check are over,” and pledged that his
reforms would end unnecessary no bid, cost-plus contracts.
• A clear preference toward fixed-price contracts
– “There shall be a preference for fixed-price type
contracts”–“Memorandum on Government Contracting”,
President Barack Obama, March 4, 2009.
– Ashton Carter, the Pentagon’s top weapons buyer, in his
interview with Bloomberg’s Peter Cook on September 14,
2010, echoed his support of “increasing the use of fixed-price
contracts”.




– Ashton Carter asked the Defense Business Board (DBB) to
form a Task Group to “consider the use of fixed-price
contracting across the full spectrum of the acquisition life
cycle and provide recommendations based on best business
practices, on when and how fixed-price contracting might
provide savings and reduce risk.” Mr. Carter also requested
the Task Group to “develop a rule set for using fixed-price
contracts over other contract types.”
• Is this ongoing policy push toward fixed-price contracts
beneficial to tax-payers? Are cost-plus contracts justifiably out
of favor? Any potential unintended consequences from wide use
of fixed-price contracts?




The Uniqueness of the DoD Contracting Environment
• DoD is both the biggest and the most unique federal
contracting agency.
• What is special about MDAP?
– Significant uncertainty exists in terms of technological
development, DoD requirements (often a moving rather
than static target), and the integration process between the
development and manufacturing as well as between the
prime contractor and the sub-contractors.
– The compliance costs associated with federal acquisition
policies and the scrutiny from federal agencies.




– Economy of scale, usually achieved through a large base of
demand, is less likely to materialize.
– The business risk associated with non-transferable
technological investments and capital expenditures within
defense industry is significant.
– Due to the extreme complexity and uncertainty inherent in
MDAPs, the long evolution and competition often result in
a sole-source contractor situation
– Other contributing factors to the sole-source situation
include the DoD’s need for secrecy, expediency, and/or





– To summarize, MDAP contract is typically a
sole-buyer-and-sole-seller case, in which market competitive
forces rarely exist and significant information asymmetry
and potential agency problem prevail.
– On the contractor side, the business risk, if not shared by
the government, could be prohibitively high.
– On the government side, the major concern is the potential
abuse of the system which stems from the agency problem
due to information asymmetry.




Unintended Consequences of Advocating
Wider Use of Fixed-Price Contracts in DoD Context
• Fixed-price contracts may work efficiently in normal
circumstances where sufficient competition and complete
certainty on technological applications exist, however, defense
contracts rarely offer such confidence.
• Consequence 1: Fixed-price contracts do not provide
risk-sharing benefits
– Without risk-sharing by the government, it’s unavoidable
that certain important but risky projects would be forgone
by the contractors because the uncertainty is too high to be
borne by contractors themselves.




• Consequence 2: Fixed-price contracts may lead to higher
government payments.
– The proponents of fixed-price contracts normally assume
that a reasonable cost estimate is available in most DoD
contracting scenarios, but this assumption rarely holds in
MDAP situations.
– Ex ante, neither the government nor the contractor
possesses the necessary information to form a good cost
estimate. However, the contractor has an informational
advantage on cost estimation.
– The impact on the contractors’ incentives in the case of
fixed-price contracts is twofold:




∗ First, to ensure against great downstream uncertainty,
the contractor will tend to provide the government with a
high cost estimate to obtain a higher fixed-price contract.
This is a typical “risk-premium” story.
∗ Second, due to information asymmetry, the contractor
has both motive and ability to artificially inflate the cost
estimate to command additional “information rents”.
∗ The combined demand for “risk premium” and the desire
to extract “information rents” determine that there is no
guarantee that taxpayers will be better-off in a fixed-price
contract as opposed to a cost-plus contract.
– In addition, the cost of extracting “information rents” in a
fixed-price contract is smaller than that for a cost-plus





– In conclusion, a fixed price contract in the absence of a
market established price and information symmetry will
lead to a higher payment from the government than under a
cost-plus contract.
• Consequence 3: Fixed-price contracts may promote
inefficient industry structure.
– Motivated by the preference toward fixed-price contracts
and the worry about frequent no-bid defense contracts,
policy makers are eager to promote a more competitive
defense industry structure. For instance, concerning
acquisition process changes, WSARA encourages
competition. Specifically, 202 requires the Secretary of




Defense to take measures to ensure competition at both the
prime contract level and the subcontract level throughout
the life-cycle of a program “as a means to improve
contractor performance.” Prime contractors are also
required to ensure their “make or buy” decisions give “full
and fair consideration” to qualified sources other than
themselves for major subsystems and components.
– Moreover, WSARA legislation tries to nurture competition
through more tightly controlling Organizational Conflict of
Interest (OCI). OCI exists when a contractor can unduly
benefit from its existing relationship in competitions for
future work.
– Critique:“The pool of expertise in sophisticated system
engineering and technical analysis for complex, often highly




classified defense areas is quite limited. There is only one
Skunk works for example. But if a company such as
Lockheed Martin is barred from working on the next stealth
fighter or SR-71 because it has helped in the initial research
and development effort, the nation will be the loser.”–Dr.
Daniel Goure.
– Critique: Conventional economic wisdom that a competitive
industry structure is better than a more concentrated one
may simply be untrue in the special defense industry. Policy
makers need to be reminded that the “single-source”
contracting environment is a natural result of long-term
competition among contractors and evolution of the free
market economy. It is an optimal response to the unique
features of the DoD major weapon systems acquisition
environment. Specifically, extreme complex and difficulty of




the projects eliminate most competitions over time; the lack
of economy scale mechanism from demand side makes
industry consolidation the only option to achieve cost
efficiency from supply side; and the abnormally high
business risks require higher rate of return which can be
partly realized from a monopoly or oligopoly industry
structure.
– Conclusion: The present industry structure is an outcome of
economic Darwinism and perhaps the best choice we have
given the one-of-a-kind DoD contracting setting. An
artificial effort to change the status quo and the policy push
to reverse the industry consolidation trend are likely to be
counter-productive and fail.





• The benefits of risk sharing associated with cost-plus contracts
come with a price. Since cost-plus contracts are most often
applied to the projects with high uncertainty and information
asymmetry, they are subject to the contractor’s manipulation
of cost reporting.
• Critics basically argue that the contractor has a blank check
from the government and hence they have little incentive to
contain cost.
• Even when the profit is a pre-specified fixed dollar amount, the
contracting firm as well as the management of the firm may be
able to derive some private benefits from incurring a larger




cost. One possible example is the “empire building” behavior
that rewards managers by growing a firm beyond the optimal
level (Jensen (1986, 1989)).
• Therefore it is vital to address the agency problem that arises
from the information asymmetry. We argue that this can be
done within the framework of cost-plus contracts so that we
can achieve better cost efficiency while in the meantime retain
the benefit of risk sharing as well.





• A traditional cost-plus incentive contract can be refined such
that the new form of contract not only keeps the conventional
risk-sharing benefits, but also aligns the contractor’s incentive
with the incentive of the government.
• “Budget-based cost-plus scheme” offers policy makers a better
choice than fixed-price contracts to improve traditional
cost-plus contracts.
• A traditional cost-plus incentive contract takes the form as
follows:
P = c+ pi(c) (1)
pi(c) = α+ β ∗ (TC − c) (2)




where P is the price paid by the government to the contractor;
c is the actual reported cost as agreed by the auditor; and pi(c)
is the contractor’s profit, which includes a target profit α , and
an incentive term for cost overruns (or underruns) above
(below) a pre-specified target cost TC . The parameter β (a
positive coefficient between 0 and 1) is the cost share
parameter. Since the profit is penalized (rewarded) when there
exists a cost overrun (underrun), the contractor is motivated to
be more cost efficient.
• The primary drawback of the traditional cost-plus-incentive
contract is that the government frequently does not possess
necessary information to form a basis for estimating target cost
due to significant information asymmetry. If is set too high, the
contractor receives windfall bonuses at the expense of
taxpayers. On the other hand, if is set too low such that the
cost overrun is unavoidable, the contractor will be unfairly





• Contractors (firms) usually have superior information
concerning the expected cost of the project, yet the government
cannot rely on the firms’ estimates since contractors, as agents,
may not truthfully reveal their beliefs due to the conflict of
interests.
• One possible remedy to this dilemma is to introduce an optimal
design of incentive contracts to ensure that the contractors
(who have an information advantage) voluntarily and truthfully
reveal their beliefs about the project’s estimated cost.
• The theoretical setting is the classical principal-agent
contracting model where the principal (i.e., the government)
carefully designs the contract format, such that the agents (i.e.,
the contractors), in maximizing their own benefits, behave in
the way that the principal desires.




• Consider a refinement of the traditional cost-plus incentive
contract where the task of estimating target cost shifts from
the government to the better informed contractor. Thus,
equation (2) is modified as follows:
pi(c, TC) = α(TC) + β(TC) ∗ (TC − c) (3)
Where, TC is the estimate of TC submitted by the contractor.
Another important modification is that both α (target profit)
and β(cost share parameter), are no longer constants. Instead,
they vary with TC to provide the correct incentives for the
contractors to truthfully reveal their unbiased cost estimate.
It is necessary to impose the following restrictions to the
functional forms of α(TC) and β(TC) such that:
α′(TC) < 0, α′′(TC) > 0, β(TC) = −α′(TC) (4)




Insert Figure 1 for the curvature of α(TC)
• It can be demonstrated that the contracts characterized by
equations (1), (3) and (4) will, as desired by the government,
induce contractors to voluntarily submit their unbiased project
cost estimate while maximizing their own benefits.
• To illustrate, insert Figure 2
• In summary, a menu of contracts characterized by equations
(1), (3) and (4) would effectively induce the truth-telling
behavior that is desirable under information asymmetry.
• A specific example is given in the paper (p14-15).
• A search of the DAMIR database shows that, out of the 69
active MDAPs for which we can identify their contract types,
none of them uses “budget-based cost-plus scheme”. Thus, the
potential improvement to cost-plus contracts is very high.





• The mindset that fixed-price contracts are better than cost-plus
contracts in limiting cost overruns may be misleading and could
potentially do more harm than good to acquisition reform.
• Cost-plus contracts should remain as the major contracting
tool in MDAPs to facilitate the implementation of major
weapon systems projects that are otherwise too risky to be
undertaken by defense contractors.
• The contractors’ opportunistic cost misbehavior under
traditional cost-plus contracts can be mitigated by using the
“budget-based cost-plus scheme”.
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